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I
INTRODUCTION
American international economic policy is an extensive system that includes
tariffs, import quotas, voluntary export-limiting agreements with foreign countries,
certain restrictions on capital inflows and outflows and on the export of tech-
nology, immigration laws, and foreign aid undertakings. In its broad outlines this
system restricts the importation of goods intensive in unskilled labor and severely
restricts the immigration of unskilled workers. It also encourages in various ways
the immigration of skilled workers while placing few other remaining restrictions
on imports of products which are intensive in land, capital, or skilled labor, gener-
ally encouraging other countries to trade freely among themselves and with the
United States.' The liberalization of international trade and payments during the
past twenty years has greatly increased international interdependency. Effective
restraints on the movement both of unskilled workers and of those goods intensive
in their services nonetheless remain, as do restrictions on capital inflow and
imports generally in the less developed countries.
This paper will explore the consequences of changing or relaxing the various
restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and capital between the United
States and Latin America. The effects of different policies on the levels of migra-
tion of both skilled and unskilled workers, the flows of goods of various types, inter-
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national investment, relative prices, and real levels of income both of countries and
of important classes of factor suppliers will be examined.
The United States allows the immigration of skilled workers from poor coun-
tries but severely limits the immigration of their unskilled workers. Would it be
better for the poor countries if the United States restricted entry of their skilled
workers? Their emigration certainly drains the home countries of the resources
devoted to their education. It also deprives local industries of their services and
must lower the productivity of the unskilled workers who remain. Moreover, the
basic injustice whereby one social segment pays for the education of another which
then leaves the country to seek much higher rates of pay is only too apparent. In
the long run it is likely to lead to a reduction of educational activity in the poor
countries.
According to a recent documentation of the emigration of skilled workers from
Latin America, about one-third of the graduates of universities and superior pro-
fessional schools emigrate to the United States. 2 This is a serious matter, as evi-
denced by the fact that in 1965 only 700 engineers and scientists were doing full-
time university teaching and research in all of Latin America. 3 Thus, too few
nationals are available there to create or adapt new technology for economic
development. The lack of development, in turn, exacerbates the pressure for emi-
gration to the United States.
Migration of skilled and unskilled labor, the international flow of capital, inter-
national trade in goods, and international differences in technology are all inti-
mately interrelated, such that none of these areas can be fruitfully studied
independently of all the others. For this paper, therefore, a numerical, general
equilibrium model was constructed to capture the basic features of the economic
relationship between the United States and Latin America. These features include
the large size and high level of technology of the American economy, its wealth of
capital stock and land relative to Latin America, and the migration, investment,
and trade policies of the two trading partners.
The main questions posed in the investigation were the following:
1) Given the restrictions on unskilled labor immigration to the United States,
would it be better to prohibit skilled labor immigration also?
2) What would be the impact of allowing both types of labor to migrate
freely to the United States?
3) If Latin American countries cannot stem the emigration of skilled labor,
should they reduce their educational efforts rather than watch the fruits of those
efforts drain away to another country?
4) Would freeing trade and foreign investment of artificial restrictions substi-
tute at least partially for worker migration, or would it also be necessary to transfer
U.S. technology abroad in order to reduce the pressure for migration?
Several of the results turned out to be quite surprising. The model indicated
2. Calculated from information in THE LATIN AMERICAN BRAIN DRAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 16-
24 (C. Cortes ed. 1980).
3. Id. at 8.
[Vol. 45: No. 2
ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
that skilled migration depresses the unskilled wage rate in the United States just as
does unskilled migration, even though skilled and unskilled workers are coopera-
tive inputs. Unrestricted unskilled labor migration to the United States would also
greatly lower the welfare of those workers as compared to the present situation.
Technological transfer to Latin America would greatly raise the joint income of
both countries, but it would also lower the real unskilled wage rate of both
countries.
The exact magnitudes of the changes reported depend, of course, on the partic-
ular numbers chosen to represent the demand, conditions, endowments, technolo-
gies, tariffs, and transportation costs affecting the countries. General arguments
for the main qualitative conclusions are therefore provided as well.
The results indicate that the immigration problem has no solution purely in its
own terms. It must be treated as a part of overall foreign economic policy aimed
ultimately at the technological improvement of the United States' poorer neigh-
bors. Otherwise, pressure for illegal immigration will be a permanent feature of
our relations with those countries.
This paper is organized as follows: The first section explains (in terms of a
simple economic model) why the United States is technologically superior to most
other countries. This digression is important because technological disparity is at
the root of the migration problem. When migration and trade are both free, all
mobile factors, seeking higher rates of remuneration, tend to gravitate to the
country or region of best technology. Such migration distorts the proportions of
mobile to immobile factors in each region and is inefficient relative to the situation
in which technology is evenly spread. A careful definition and explanation of tech-
nological disparity also serves to remove some of the hidden emotional blocks to
the clear discussion of the relations between rich and poor countries.
The second section of the paper sets up the model of economic relations as
between technologically disparate countries under numerical assumptions appro-
priate to the United States and its Latin American neighbors. This section also
describes four experiments that were performed involving migration between tech-
nologically disparate countries. The third section of the paper details policy exper-
iments performed on the model which were designed to explore superior
alternatives to the migration of both unskilled and skilled labor. The fourth sec-
tion comments briefly on the most important findings of those experiments.
II
TECHNOLOGICAL DISPARITY AND THE PRESSURE FOR MIGRATION
The immediate reason for a factor of production to migrate is for its owners to
obtain a higher real rate of remuneration. If technology were identical interna-
tionally, as assumed in the leading current theory of international trade, 4 this
4. This is the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory. It derives from Heckscher, The Effects of For-
eign Trade on the Distribution of Income, EKONOMISK TIDSKRwI'r (1919) and B. OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1933). The theory assumes that tastes and production functions are internation-
ally identical, that production functions are homogeneous and subject to diminishing marginal returns to
factor inputs, and that trade is free of tariffs and transport costs. It predicts that countries will export
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reason would not exist, provided that capital and goods moved internationally
without tariffs or excessive transportation costs. When a country is technologically
superior, trade in goods and capital services cannot equalize earnings internation-
ally because the country will specialize exclusively in the production of goods
intensive in the mobile factors. 5 The United States exhibits this pattern. It
attracts capital and both skilled and unskilled labor from overseas, while most of
its overseas investment is direct, involving the transfer of U.S. technology to plants
in foreign countries. 6 In order to assess whether or not this fundamental cause of
immigration is likely to remain, it is necessary to explain how and why the United
States is technologically superior.
Technology is here given the narrowest possible interpretation. It refers only to
the observable relationships between inputs and outputs in distinct production
processes. Lety stand for the quantity of the output of such a process and x for its
one or more inputs. The production process is then described by the equation)y =
ax t, where the coefficient a represents the level of technology (a higher value of a
means that x is more efficiently transformed into y) and where 1/a therefore
expresses the amount of x needed to produce a unit ofy. Better technology means
that such input requirements are reduced.
Next assume that the coefficient a is itself subject to improvement via the input
of resources x 2. Let the equation a = x 2 " represent the production of new knowl-
edge as a function ofx 2-the resources devoted to research and development (R &
D). In this equation the exponent e indicates the elasticity of new knowledge with
respect to R & D. It is assumed to be less than unity and greater than zero.
Because total resources for producingy are equal to x = (xI + x 2), we havey = a (x
- x 2) = xx 2 - X 2elI. The problem facing the producer ofy is to determine the
best level ofx 2 or R & D in order to maximize the output of, for his given total
resources x. This is done by differentiating the expression for, with respect to x 2 ,
setting that derivative equal to zero, and solving for x 2 in terms of x:
! y = exx 2e-1 -1 e+~
a XX 2  -(e +l)xf =0
The appropriate manipulations yield the following primary results:
ex
(i) x 2 = (e+lI)
products intensive in their relatively abundant factors and thereby--to some extent, at least-alleviate the
international factor-price differentials that would incite migration of the mobile factors. The celebrated
factor-price equalization theorem states that factor prices will equalize completely under the Heckscher-
Ohlin assumptions so long as the countries involved continue to produce in common and to trade at least
as many products as there are primary factors. See Lerner, Factor Prtices and International Trade 19
ECONOMICA 1 (1952); Lerner International Factor Przce Equalzation Once Again, 59 ECON. J. 181 (1949); W.
TRAVIS, THE THEORY OF TRADE AND PROTECTIONl- 112 (1964).
5. This proposition is illustrated in the experiments below that allow capital, labor, and skilled labor
to migrate freely between the two technologically disparate countries. The proposition is therefore impor-
tant for the theory of migration, but has appeared only briefly in the international trade literature. For an
early statement, see Jones, The Role of Technology in the Theory of International Trade, in THE TECHNOLOGY
FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 73, 83, 84 (R. Vernon ed. 1970).
6. For a full description of the patterns of U.S. foreign investment and trade, see Branson, Trends in
United States Trade and Investment, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 183 (M. Feldstein ed. 1980).
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e
(iii) ) =
(e+ 1) -1,
Because the coefficient ofxe+ I in equation (iii) is a constant (depending only
on the elasticity e), and because e lies between zero and one, the comprehensive
production functiony =f(x) for 3y is subject to increasing returns to scale. Out-
putsy increase in greater proportion than inputs when R & D is optimized, even
though the direct product functionsy = ax, which one observes in practice may be
subject to constant returns to scale.7
The observable productivity coefficient a in)y = ax , can be obtained by differ-
entiating equation (iii) with respect to x. In economic theory this derivative is
called the marginal product of the total inputs x, and should approximate the rate
of remuneration of those inputs, such as wages and rentals, depending on the exact
institutional arrangements of the economy in question. The marginal product of
x - a is itself an increasing function of x and thus rises with the size of the
economy as R & D is optimally performed. A consistent and purely economic
explanation of U.S. technological superiority over its much smaller Latin Amer-
ican neighbors therefore exists: the large size of the U.S. resource base relative to
theirs. Size alone raises all factor rewards, as equation (ii) indicates, and thus
attracts mobile factors of production (notably skilled and unskilled labor). In
answer to the motivating question of this section, this technological superiority is
likely to persist for a very long time, barring an extraordinary change in the condi-
tions under which technology is transferred to other countries.
III
ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICALLY
DISPARATE COUNTRIES
This section presents a model of two countries that are: 1) mutually open to
both international trade and the migration of capital and both skilled and
unskilled labor, and 2) subject to tariffs on imports of goods and services and to
international transportation costs affecting goods, services, capital equipment, and
the two types of labor. The model operates by assuming in different experiments
that capital, unskilled labor, and skilled labor are internationally mobile (though
7. Several studies have shown that carefully measured increases in the inputs of capital and labor and
changes in their allocation and composition over time fail to explain the corresponding increase in aggre-
gate output. According to E. DENISON, THE SOURCES OF GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES 266 (Com-
mittee for Economic Development Supp. Paper No. 13, 1962), input growth explained directly only a 2%
rise in aggregate output between 1929 and 1957 when that output rose by 2.93%. Denison explained the
residual by advances in knowledge (0.58), scale economies (0.34), and other causes (0.01). The R & D
model herein is perfectly consistent with these findings. It exhibits overall scale economies that make
output grow faster than do inputs as it makes endogenous the creation and effects on output of new knowl-
edge, which is treated exogenously by Denison. For a recent account of U.S. technology in comparative
and other terms, see Mansfield, Technology and Producttvity in the United States, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
IN TRANSITION 563 (M. Feldstein ed. 1980). •
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still subject to transport costs) or, alternatively, are immobile (the transport costs
are made prohibitive). Presented also are experiments in which tariffs are lifted
and an experiment in which the poor country restricts its formation of skilled
workers in an attempt to stem the outflow of resources which their emigration
represents.
Testing and examining trade in goods and the migration of labor and of cap-
ital as alternatives requires a classification, presented in table 1, of goods according
to their relative input requirements per ton of material outputs for capital,
unskilled labor, and skilled labor. Table 2 arranges the numbers representing all
unit input requirements in an input-output table. Such tables have been con-
structed for most countries and are widely used in forecasting and planning.8
Unfortunately, no table has been constructed according to the required classifica-
tion scheme of table 1 and all existing tables are in value terms, rather than in the
necessary physical unit.
The immense empirical work that reworking existing tables would require
(with uncertain results) can be avoided through a careful consideration of certain
physical constraints affecting all production. A ton of anything must contain a ton
of matter which ultimately comes from the earth or from land. One category of
products, 1-3 in the tables, therefore needs mainly land in addition to inputs of
Products 10, 11, and 7, while a second category, corresponding to the whole spec-
trum of services and of processed and manufactured goods, requires mainly the
material inputs of Products 1-3 in addition to inputs of Products 10, 11, and 7.
These are the Products 4-6, each ton of which needs about one ton of Products 1-3.
Because no reported correlation exists between the capital and labor intensiveness
of processed and manufactured goods and that of their material inputs, Products
1, 2, and 3 were each given equal importance as inputs into each of the Products 4,
5, and 6, as can be seen in table 2.
The unit requirements of Products 1-6 for Products 10, 11, and 7 have been
chosen to span the maximum area of the relevant input simplexes (the triangles
formed in the input space 7, 10, and 11 by constraining all input coefficients to
sum to unity) consistent with reasonable usage of all relevant factors and with
imparting the same importance to each product within its category. Because the
choice of physical units in which to measure inputs of Products 7, 10, and 11 is
perfectly arbitrary, the only empirical assumption is that products are symmetri-
cally distributed with respect to their relative input requirements.
8. For some applications involving both the Unted States and various developing countries, see C.
ALMON, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY TO 1975: AN INTERINDUSTRY FORECAST (1966); Ayres & Shapanka,
Explicit Technological Substitution Forecasts in Long-Range Input-Output Models, 9 TECHN. FORECASTING & SOC.
CHANGE 113 (1976); Bottomley, Input-Output Studzis of Developing Economnes, in MEDIUM-TERM DYNAMIC
FORECASTING 223 (W. Grossling ed. 1977); A. CARTER, STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY CONTRIBUTION TO INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS (1970); W. LEONTIEF, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
UNITED STATES ECONOMY 1919-39 (1941); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE INPUT-OUTPUT
STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1972 (Nov. 1977); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF: LABOR, THE STRUCTURE
OF THE U.S. ECONOMY IN 1980 TO 1985 (1975).
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TABLE 1
NOMENCLATURE
Product No: Type or Name of Product:
I Capital-Intensive Land Products
2 Labor-Intensive Land Products
3 Skilled Labor-Intensive Land Products
4 Capital-Intensive Manufactures and Services
5 Labor-Intensive Manufactures and Services
6 Skilled Labor-Intensive Manufactures and Services
7 Skilled Labor
8 International Transport
9 Land
10 Capital
11 Unskilled Labor
Table 2 represents the technology of each of the two countries. Each product is
produced by an industry bearing its same number, with the unit output in ques-
tion being indicated by +1.0. The remaining (negative) coefficients in each
column represent that industry's unit input requirements. In addition to the six
products and industries described above, there also exists an industry which pro-
duces international transport services (measured in terms of tonnage transported)
and an industry which produces skilled labor (measured in natural units). Skilled
labor, considered as a product, is obviously intensive in unskilled labor, the subject
of the training, while transport services are considered neutral with respect to their
input requirements.
The technological superiority of Country 2 is modelled by making its unit
input requirements of Products 7, 9, 10, and 11 substantially lower than the corre-
sponding coefficients of Country 1, as shown in table 2. While there is no indispu-
table way to determine superiority empirically at this level of aggregation of actual
countries and products, in view of the vast income disparity between the United
States and most Latin American countries, the assumption of a universal 4-to-i
U.S. productivity advantage is highly conservative. Increasing the productivity
advantage would preserve and accentuate all of the qualitative conclusions. On
the other hand, the implicit assumption in table 2 that technological disparity is
unrelated to factor usage is possibly untrue; here, too, empirical studies are lack-
ing. Finally, each industry's input and output coefficients in table 2 are taken to be
invariant with respect to its level of operation (constant returns to scale) or to that
of any other industry or set of industries (no external economies or diseconomies).
On the demand side of the economy, each individual member of each country
has a utility function of the exponential form
u= dl. .. '-
where d, is the amount that he consumes of the kth product, where the exponent eA
expresses its relative importance, and where e, + e2 + . . . + e,= 1. The assump-
tion that everyone shares this basic utility function means that it applies indiffer-
ently to social groups, classes, countries, and the world community, regardless of
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TABLE 2
TECHNOLOGY
Country l's Technology:
Activities: (1)
Inputs/Outputs:
1 1.0000
2 0.0
3 0.0
4 -0.0010 -
5 -0.0010 -
6 -0.0010 -
7 -0.1000 -
8 0.0
9 -1.0000 -
10 -1.0000 -
11 -0.2000 -
Country 2's Technology:
Activities: (1)
Inputs/Outputs:
1 1.0000
2 0.0
3 0.0
4 -0.0010 -
5 -0.0010 -
6 -0.0010 -
7 -0.0250 -
8 0.0
9 -0.2500 -
10 -0.2500 -
11 -0.0500 -
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0
1.0000
0.0
0.0010
0.00 10
0.0010
0.1000
0.0
1.0000
0.2000
1.0000
0.0
0.0
1.0000
-0.0010
-0.0010
-0.0010
- 1.0000
0.0
- 1.0000
-0.2000
0.0
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.3000
1.0000
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.1000
0.0
0.0
-1.0000
-0.2000
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.0100
1.0000
-0. 1000
-0.1000
0.0
0.0
-0.2000
-1.0000
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.0100
-0.0100
1.0000
-1.0000
0.0
0.0
-0.2000
0.0
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
1.0000
0.0
-0.1000
-1.0000
-1.5000
-0.2000
-0.2000
-0.2000
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.4000
1.0000
-0.1000
-0.5000
-0.5000
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0
1.0000
0.0.
-0.0010
-0.0010
-0.0010
0.0250
0.0
0.2500
-0.0500
0.2500
0.0
0.0
1.0000
-0.0010
-0.0010
-0.0010
-0.2500
0.0
-0.2500
-0.0500
0.0
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.3000
1.0000
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0250
0.0
0.0
-0.2500
-0.0500
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.0100
1.0000
-0.0100
-0.2500
0.0
0.0
-0.0500
-0.2500
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.3000
-0.0100
-0.0100
1.0000
-0.2500
0.0
0.0
-0.0500
0.0
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.0106
-0.0100
1.0000
0.0
-0.0025
-0.2500
-1.0125
-0.2000
-0.2000
-0.2000
'-0:0100
-0.0100
-0.0100
-0.1000
1.0000
-0.0025
-0.1250
-0.1250
the distribution of income among the individual members in question. 9 This is a
reasonable assumption because end products are defined here in terms of direct
and indirect factor content and not in terms of purpose, materials, or attributes. It
asserts only that everyone has identical tastes for the factor services embodied in
end products, not for those goods themselves. This makes it possible to consider
the dependent variable u as a cardinal measure of economic wellbeing or, in other
words, of the real income of a group (such as unskilled labor), of a country, or of a
set of trading partners. The term "utils" is often used in economics to name the
units for measuring u and will be adopted here.
The exponential utility function has other certain convenient properties. If the
consumer maximizes his utility. level as expressed by this function (subject to his
income constraint), the share of his income that he spends for a given product will
9. For a discussion of the problems involved in aggregating individual preferences to obtain social
preference and demand functions, see Chipman & Moore, On Socala We/fare Functions and the Aggregation of
Preferences, J. EcoN. THEORY 111 (1979).
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be equal to its exponent. Thus, his demand d for the kth product will be equal to
e.r/pk, where r is his money income and pA is the price that he faces for the kth
product. This relationship determines in the various experiments the amount of
each product that will be demanded in each country as a function only of that
country's money income and its list of prices, given the constant expenditure shares
reported in table 3.
TABLE 3
EXPENDITURE SHARES
Product In Country I In Country 2
I .................................. 0.04 0 .04
2 ................................... 0 .04 0 .04
3 ................................... 0 .04 0.04
4 ................................... 0 .30 0 .30
5 ................................... 0 .28 0 .28
6 ................................... 0 .30 0 .30
7 ................................... 0.00 0.00
8 ................................... 0 .00 0 .00
Table 4 lists the assumed endowments of goods, services, and primary factors
for the two countries in the model. No initial supplies of products are assumed,
but only primary factors. In particular, all skilled labor is produced within the
production period assumed for the long term analysis. Observe that Country I has
a large supply of unskilled labor relative to its supplies of land and capital (as
compared with Country 2) and that each country owns some factors located in the
other. The United States (Country 2) thus has some land and capital in Country
1, while some of Country l's unskilled workers are located in Country 2. The
income of all of a country's factors, whether they work at home or abroad, is
credited to its national income in this model.
TABLE 4
PRIMARY FACTOR ENDOWMENTS
Of Country 1 Of Country 2
Factor At Home Abroad At Home Abroad
9 ................ 38.00 0.00 100.00 2.00
10 ................ 40.00 0.00 115.00 5.00
11 ................ 155.55 5.00 120.00 0.00
Table 5 lists the ad valorem tariff rates which apply currently to international
trade between Latin America and the United States. The tariffs of Country 1 are
particularly high for manufactured goods, in categories 4 through 6, in accordance
with the import-substituting policies of Latin American countries. The American
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tariffs discriminate against imports which are intensive in the services of unskilled
labor. t0
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE AD VALOREM IMPORT DUTIES
Product Of Country I Of Country 2
1 .......................... ........ 7.00 1.0 0
2 .................................. 5.00 10 .00
3 .................................. 12.00 1.00
4 .................................. 25.00 0.00
5 .................................. 20.00 12.00
6 .................................. 25.00 10 .00
7 .................................. 0 .00 0 .00
8 .................................. 5.00 6.00
The importation of any product requires transport services, i.e., Product 8.
Those services may be provided locally or may themselves be imported. The
assumptions regarding unit transport costs will be listed separately for each experi-
ment performed with the model, because the different policies restricting migra-
tion and capital imports will be represented as if they were prohibitive unit
transport requirements, equal to 99.00 of Product 8 per unit imports of the factor
service in question.
Each policy experiment is a run of the model using the above numbers. Solu-
tions must all possess the following properties: 1) each country's demand for each
product is equal to its net availabilities of that product whenever its price exceeds
zero, 2) all prices must be non-negative, and 3) the unit profits net of taxes of any
operating industry or importing activity must be equal to zero and less than zero
otherwise. The four experiments made in this section all assume that Country 2 is
technologically superior to Country 1 as shown by the primary input coefficients in
table 2. Each experiment title bears a policy number for comparing its results with
those of several others as depicted in table 7.
Experiment A posits the existing situation-namely, that some illegal unskilled
labor immigration to the United States has already taken place (five units of
Country l's labor work in Country 2); that skilled labor, once it is formed in either
country, is free to emigrate to the other; and that no other factor of production is
free to move from one country to the other. These mobility assumptions are
reported in the first two columns of the first table of experiment A. The columns
labelled "Gross Domestic Production" in that table report the levels at which the
various activities of table 2 operate. The net availabilities of products that are
reported are equal to the gross domestic outputs plus imports (also reported) minus
domestic intermediate usage (which is not reported). The final two columns in the
table report the prices of goods (Items 1 through 8) and factor services (Items 9
through 11). The second table in the experiment reports the national income of
each country in terms of the international monetary unit and also in real terms
10. See supra note 1.
[Vol. 45: No. 2
Page 81: Spring 1982] ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
tC
U-Ce
Q >
z:
0
U
Z EA C
0 0
t-
0
0
U
0.00
0
z
E
-00
e'jc c,1=8oc~o
Lm 00c~ 0) u 0 cco 0 0
cl) e 04 C'j
0 r- 0 0 00 w 8 0 8
000000-00l 00
ED 000800
o cJ o'~ 0 ( 0- C5 ~0
C, 0 rO c C'. O d O i
n~ C'i - -n cr c 00- 0 C) '0 r--F- -d- C14cco
It -0 q~ .' , -
o - 0 ei c'j n c - C'j
"I l 1' 00000D
c)co 'o - r- cc) 0000
ceJ cI r- C' rn
cr- c- -0 00
0 o
cJC14 C'J
q'~ 000 q C00
-- d 0 (
0
o o C 4
0
z. ~ ..
dC4
1.0 G~ F7; m C4 ccm
't 0c -d -0 r-
wc r .n - wc c. n
t 0 -.1 - -) n
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
(as utils calculated by the exponential formula explained above), using the expen-
diture shares reported in table 3 and the net availabilities as reported in the first
table of the experiment. World real income is the sum of the national levels. All
seven experiments in this paper will be presented in the same way as is experiment
A.
Country 2 imports 7.2643 units of skilled labor in experiment A, an amount
equal to about one-third of Country l's production of 19.8428 units of skilled
labor. Unskilled labor fetches 27.1821 monetary units per unit in Country 1, as
compared with 202.4567 units in Country 2. Skilled wage rates, however, are com-
parable in the two countries in view of the freedom of skilled labor to migrate and
the moderate international transportation costs that apply. This freedom creates a
large earnings disparity between the two types of labor within Country 1.
While the money wage differential in this experiment is certainly large enough
to induce unskilled labor to migrate to Country 2, the best measure of that induce-
ment is the disparity in real wages. A country's real wage rate can be computed by
multiplying its money wage rate by its real national income, as expressed in utils,
and dividing the result by the country's national income in monetary units." I The
calculation (27.1821 times 18.6015 divided by 16048.6642) yields 0.031506 as
Country l's real unskilled wage rate in utils. The corresponding rate in Country 2
by the same calculation is 0.262244 utils.
The injustice to unskilled workers in Country 1 who cannot avail themselves of
educational opportunities is obvious in experiment A. Experiment B examines,
therefore, what would happen if Country 2 should apply the same restrictions to
skilled labor immigration as it applies to the unskilled, and lists the corresponding
transport-cost assumptions and the results of the new calculation. The real income
of Country 1 rises from 18.6015 utils to 20.4564 utils, and the unskilled money
wage rate increases to 83.0901 units. The real unskilled wage rate in Country 1
rises to 0.078414 utils per unit, and in Country 2 to 0.299472 utils. The unskilled
wage rate more than doubles in Country 1 when skilled labor migration is stopped
and, surprisingly, rises in Country 2 as well. Country 2 now imports more
unskilled labor-intensive products from Country 1 and its real income declines
somewhat. World real income remains almost exactly the same.
Although Country l's unskilled workers benefit from Country 2's restriction of
skilled labor migration, the only way of effectuating an equivalent policy would
probably be to change the political regime of Country 1 and to prohibit skilled
worker emigration, as did East Germany and Cuba. A nearly equivalent policy,
however, would be for Country I to reduce the national output of skilled workers.
11. One of the disturbing recent changes in the U.S. economy is the decline in the rates of growth of
the real wage rate of labor productivity since about 1968. Freeman, The Evaluation of the American Labor
Market, 1948-80, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN TRANsrION 351 (M. Feldstein ed. 1980), documents this
decrease and reports that its causes remain mysterious. Surely however, immigration and liberalized for-
eign investment and trade (which Freeman does not mention) have depressed the unskilled wage rate just
as our models in this paper indicate would happen under those circumstances. As it has in the past, the
continued failure of real wages to rise and their eventual possible decline will undoubtedly raise domestic
political awareness of the relationship between foreign economic policy and the distributions of the
national income.
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To simulate this policy, the model subjects Activity 7 in Country 1 to an ad
valorem tax on its output, skilled labor. Experiments with this tax rate indicate
that Country l's real national income reaches a maximum of 22.1904 utils when
the rate is set at 0.30 (30%), and that the real unskilled wage rate in Country 1
reaches a maximum of 0. 106516 utils per unit when the tax rate is 0.20. This rate
was accordingly chosen for experiment C, which otherwise reverts to the mobility
assumptions of experiment A. Experiment C raises the real unskilled wage rate in
Country 2 to 0.270341 utils per unit, which is slightly higher than that rate under
experiment A. For easy comparison, the real national incomes and unskilled wage
rates of the two countries are reported in table 7 for twenty-two different policy
experiments as described in table 6. Experiment C (policy 3a in table 7) yields
very nearly the highest unskilled wage rate for Country 1 of all the policies.
It is ironic that the retrograde policy of taxing education (or failing to subsidize
it optimally) in Country 1 is nonetheless highly beneficial to those of its workers
who are unable to avail themselves of educational opportunities provided at public
expense. Indeed, the unskilled real wage rate more than triples as compared to its
level in experiment A (policy 3 in table 7). Unskilled workers certainly form a
majority in the typical country belonging to our Country 1 category. Under a fair
democratic regime they would rationally vote to remain in a position of interna-
tional intellectual inferiority. The formation of a national trained elite, on the
other hand, would imply some degree of authoritarianism.
Experiment D now asks what would happen if, when Country 1 removes its
education tax in experiment C, the countries then permitted the free international
migration of both skilled and unskilled labor while still prohibiting the migration
of capital. (Tables 6 and 7 omit this policy.) Country 2's import column reveals
that it no longer imports any skilled workers from Country 1 (although that migra-
tion is free), but instead receives 66.3644 unskilled workers-equal to 42% of
Country l's work force. This vast migration depresses the unskilled wage rate in
Country 2 to the level that just covers international transport costs, which means
that the unskilled wage rate falls to zero in Country 1. Country 2's real income
increases considerably, while that of Country 1 declines drastically.
The surprising results of experiment D confirm one's visceral feeling that unfet-
tered migration of unskilled labor to the United States would be a disaster, how-
ever unjust the restrictions. The next section looks for available policies that can
resolve this fundamental dilemma of immigration policy.
IV
INDIRECT APPROACHES TO THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM
The surprises which the general equilibrium study of migration has revealed in
the preceding section motivate a systematic search of the full range of available
foreign and domestic economic policy instruments bearing on migration incen-
tives. For example, eliminating tariffs should remove some of the pressure for the
migration of unskilled workers. The lack of the best technology may hamper this
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policy, however, and so the effects of transferring U.S. technology to countries of
emigration must also be examined. Although it is widely believed that the transfer
of U.S. technology damages its competitive position and presumably, therefore,
damages U.S. real income,' 2 the United States would actually benefit from the
transfer of its technology. The American income distribution, however, would be
severely altered.
Table 6 is a list of twenty comprehensive policy combinations affecting migra-
tion, income distribution, and national income. The tariffs which apply are those
listed in table 5. Technology transfer means that both countries enjoy Country 2's
technology, as listed in table 2.
TABLE 6
POLICIES
No.:
I Technology Differs, No Mobility, Tariffs
2 Technology Differs, No Mobility, Free Trade
3 Technology Differs, Skilled Labor Mobile, Tariffs
4 Technology Differs, Skilled Labor Mobile, Free Trade
5 Technology Differs, Capital Mobile, Tariffs .
6 Technology Differs, Capital Mobile, Free Trade
7 Technology Differs, Skilled Labor and Capital Mobile, Tariffs
8 Technology Differs, Skilled Labor and Capital Mobile, Free Trade
9 Technology Differs, Full Mobility, Tariffs
10 Technology Differs, Full Mobility, Free Trade
11 Technology Transfer, No Mobility, Tariffs
12 Technology Transfer, No Mobility, Free Trade
13 Technology Transfer, Skilled Labor Mobile, Tariffs
14 Technology Transfer, Skilled Labor Mobile, Free Trade
15 Technology Transfer, Capital Mobile, Tariffs
16 Technology Transfer, Capital Mobile, Free Trade
17 Technology Transfer, Skilled Labor and Capital Mobile, Tariffs
18 Technology Transfer, Skilled Labor and Capital Mobile, Free Trade
19 Technology Transfer, Full Mobility, Tariffs
20 Technology Transfer, Full Mobility, Free Trade
Table 7 summarizes the results of the twenty policies listed in table 6, plus the
subpolicies 3a and 4a in which Country 1 performs the educational experiment
already reported. Policy 3a is experiment C. In policy 4a, Country 1 further
restricts the formation of skilled labor, as if it were now subject to a 30% rather
than only a 20% tax. This policy yields the highest level of Country l's real
national income of all policies in which technology remains disparate. Table 7
presents the real unskilled wage rate in each country as a function of the policy
adopted and also of each country's real income. Real wage rates are calculated as
before, by multiplying the ratio of the money wage rate to the money national
income of the country by its level of real income.
. 12. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 6, at 186.
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TABLE 7
SELECTED RESULTS OF TWENTY BASIC POLICIES
No. Unskilled Labor's Real Wage
Country 1
.078414
.110821
.031506
.106516
.084034
.103653
.045414
.109789
.030211
.084702
.00
.006987
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
Country 2
.299472
.276338
.262244
.270341
.245416
.276344
.297715
.280115
.239638
.251932
.017910
.024870
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
Country 1
20.4564
22.1542
18.6015
22.1759
20.6444
22.1904
20.1849
22.1526
17.7149
20.9119
8.0236
9.8886
36.0015
37.0260
36.0015
37.0260
36.0015
37.0260
36.0015
37.0260
36.0015
37.0260
(Real Income In)
Country 2
83.0901
81.6971
85.3642
81.6752
83.5109
81.6606
83.5713
81.8121
86.1032
83.2508
96.9317
96.3848
100.8585
99.9573
100.8585
99.9573
100.8585
99.9573
100.8585
99.9573
100.8585
99.9573
Experiments E, F, and G have been selected as further illustration of the key
policies revealed through table 7. Experiment E illustrates policy 2 and indicates
the result when free trade is substituted for the mobility of skilled labor, capital,
and unskilled labor. Table 7 reveals that this policy yields the highest real wage
rate in Country 1 of all the policies and also the highest ratio of Country l's real
wage rate to that of Country 2. Presumably, this is the policy in table 7 which
most reduces the incentive for unskilled labor to migrate to Country 2, so long as
technology is not transferred.
Experiment F illustrates policy 10 which, of all the technological disparity poli-
cies, yields the highest joint income in the two countries. This policy permits full
freedom of trade in goods, capital, and human services but no technology transfer,
and is therefore the most liberal of the first ten policies.
Experiment F also demonstrates that the technologically superior country
tends to draw in all the mobile factors of production. 13 Country 2's table of
activity levels in experiment F indicates that it should import both capital services
and the services of unskilled labor. Country 1 and its unskilled workers fare badly
under this liberal policy while Country 2, apart from its unskilled workers, fares
13. See supra text accompanying note 6.
World
103.5465
103.8513
103.9657
103.8511
104.1553
103.8510
103.7562
103.9647
103.8180
104.1627
104.9554
106.2734
136.8599
136.9834
136.8599
136.9834
136.8599
136.9834
136.8599
136.9834
136.8599
136.9834
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very well. Policies 4 and 8 provide comparable results since the freedom of capital
to migrate makes little difference under technological disparity.1
4
None of the first ten policies listed in table 7 either.significantly raises Country
l's income or greatly reduces the gap between the wage rates of the two countries.
The next task therefore is to see if an effective transfer of technology to Country 1
would alter those objectives.
The answer is "yes," but that raises another problem: the wage rates equalize
at zero (and the profit rates very nearly do so) as capital and unskilled labor both
become free goods in Country 1 and unskilled labor becomes so in Country 2 as
well. Experiment G shows that in that case land alone captures all income in
Country 1 and very nearly all in Country 2. Because only land supplies effectively
limit output now, restrictions on the migration of capital and labor become nuga-
tory, as policies 11-20 in table 7 show. Tariffs also make little difference in this
single-technology and (nearly) single-factor world.
Experiment G nonetheless reveals that technology transfer can raise the
incomes of poor countries. Technology transfer is certainly more powerful in this
respect than any of the other elements (commodity buffer stocks, price supports for
primary products, tariff preferences, increased economic aid, and debt forgiveness)
for favoring developing countries in the New International Economic Order (a UN
discussion forum). Unlike those other policies, technology transfer creates new
income in the developing countries, as opposed to merely transferring it there from
developed countries.
V
CONCLUSIONS
Present U.S. immigration policies permit liberal entry of highly skilled workers
and ban, but largely condone, entry of unskilled workers. The U.S.-Mexican
border is barely patrolled, identification papers for employment are easily counter-
feited, and penalties are derisory. The result is a large and growing illegal work
force, consisting mainly of isolated prime-age males subject to unsavory working
and living conditions and to various types of exploitation and extortion. This de
facto immigration policy threatens to deteriorate the social, economic, and polit-
ical equilibrium of this country and of Mexico and the other important emigration
countries as well. Much more open discussion of this issue is needed, as is a clear
14. Policy 10 (experiment E) proves that what the French economist Arghiri Emmanuel calls "une-
qual trade" is a distinct possibility. He claims that capital migration from rich to poor countries lowers the
earnings of the latter. Experiment E (or D) shows that worker migration from the poor to the rich country
does the same thing. Direct foreign investment by Country 2 in Country I to produce goods with l's labor
for 2's market is, of course, equivalent to the emigration of those same workers to 2 and so Emmanuel was
right: liberalized foreign investment can damage a country. Unfortunately he was right for the wrong
reasons. Paul Samuelson and Pascal Salin have demolished his model and analysis but have wrongly
denied the possibility of unequal trade. See A. EMMANUEL, L'ECHANGE INEGAL, UN ESSAI SUR LES
ANTAGONISMES DANS LES RAPPORTS INTERNATIONAUX (2d ed. 1972). This book was translated as
UNEQUAL EXCHANGE: A STUDY OF THE IMPERIALISM OF TRADE (1972). See also Samuelson, Illog~me de la
Doctrine Neo-marxienne de /'Echange Inigal, 17 COMMENTAIRE 52-62 (1982) and Salin, Echange Inigal et Illusion
Scientifque, 17 COMMENTAIRE 63-71 (1982).
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objective picture of the available alternative courses of action. The effects of
immigration policies are irreversible and so fundamental that little direct experi-
mentation is possible; experiments must be performed on model economies, as in
this paper. If the models are sufficiently realistic, it should be possible to identify
the best (or at least a good) set of policies and to build a broad consensus in its
favor before implementation. The immigration problem is much deeper than
expected. It touches the sensitive roots of income distribution, on which consensus
is never directly possible. In this concluding section the discussion will center on
the relevance of the model employed, the main conclusions drawn from its manip-
ulation, and some possible ways of accommodating the inevitable shifts in income
distribution which must accompany any effective policy.
The relevance and novelty of the fairly large model employed here lies first in
its distinction between skilled labor (which is a product requiring primary and
intermediate inputs for its manufacture) and the primary inputs of capital, land,
and unskilled labor. In this respect, the model goes well beyond the usual two-
factor versions of international economic theory and permits us to study education,
technology, and relative factor supplies as determinants of migration. Secondly,
the model permits a full examination of the role of technological disparities which
are at the heart of the migration problem, and of technology transfers to overcome
them. Finally, the model easily incorporates the main forms of government inter-
vention in the economy: tariffs, taxes on inputs and outputs, and quantitative
restrictions on international movements of capital equipment and of skilled and
unskilled labor.
Experiments with selected combinations of such interventions revealed that all
of the model's features are essential to the study of migration problems and that
immigration policy cannot be separated from a comprehensive international eco-
nomic policy. The precise aim of such a policy should be to achieve a high degree
of effective international economic integration without suffering the highly dis-
torting and permanent side effects of migration. Changes in tariffs, educational
policy, and the allocation of technology all have large effects on the real incomes
both of countries and of their various factor suppliers. Thus, they all affect the
incentive to migrate.
Obviously, an even larger computable general equilibrium model would be
better, although probably not in proportion to its size. Computational and espe-
cially expositional difficulties mount rapidly with size and so considerable thought
was invested in discovering the smallest adequate model. Only time and cost pre-
clude a much larger model, one recognizing perhaps more factor categories (e.g.,
mobile and immobile capital goods, agricultural and mineral-bearing types of
land, capital goods and skills irreversibly specialized to certain activities) and cor-
respondingly more categories of goods. A disaggregation of Country 1 into its
actual component countries would better emphasize the dominant role of Mexico
and enable us to specify technology, distance, and factor endowments more
exactly. It would also reveal the effects of bilateral policies on third countries.
The policy experiments break down into two categories, depending upon
whether technology is transferred or not. If it is not transferred, then policy 2 (see
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tables 6 and 7 and experiment E) most narrows the unskilled wage-rate gap and
therefore presumably best mitigates the incentive for unskilled labor to migrate to
the United States. This policy prohibits foreign investment, migration, and tech-
nology transfer, but institutes free trade in goods and services.
It is doubtful that policy 2 narrows wage-rate differentials sufficiently to solve
the American immigration problem, that is the continued influx of illegal
unskilled workers. Much of the improvement over the actual situation, policy 3
(experiment A), is a result of the prohibition under policy 2 of skilled labor immi-
gration. This is probably much easier to control than unskilled labor immigration.
Table 7 reveals that the slight reduction of U.S. real income under policy 2 closely
matches the increase in that of Country 1. This means that skilled labor emigra-
tion to the United States is tantamount to a transfer of real income---direct foreign
aid-in the same direction, a transfer which U.S. foreign aid in the opposite direc-
tion far from compensates. Mexico and the other Latin American emigration
countries should therefore press the United States to restrict immigration of skilled
workers. Failing that, the retrograde policy of cutting back on higher education
(policy 3a) achieves very nearly the same real economic benefits. Failing either of
those two policies, the emigration countries should consider ways of preventing
skilled workers from leaving.
The injustice of the actual situation in Latin America, in which unskilled
workers pay to raise the earnings of a small elite (only to see their own earnings
fall), is obvious. Political instability is inherent in this situation. Eventually, either
educational opportunities in those countries will wither, or regimes capable of
stemming the hemorrhaging of skilled labor will be installed. A comparison in
table 7 of the relevant real wage rates under policies 3, 3a, and 2 shows that policy
3, supporting the status quo, represents a vast transfer of income from the unskilled
labor force to its few members privileged to acquire internationally vendible skills.
While policy 3 represents the de jure intent of present immigration and trade
practices, the condoning of illegal, unskilled immigration plus the general trend
toward freer international capital movements constitutes a real world more like
that described in experiment D and policies 8 and 9. These experiments reveal,
surprisingly, that unrestricted unskilled labor immigration collapses the wage rate
in both countries. In addition to stemming the outflow of skilled workers, the Latin
American countries therefore have a strong incentive to eventually stem that of
unskilled labor as well, in order to keep the U.S. wage rate from falling too low.
Meanwhile, unskilled workers already in the United States have a clear interest in
stopping all further immigration.
The preceding conclusions apply when the country of immigration is techno-
logically superior in all activities. Section II analyzed the reasons for such superi-
ority and disclosed that economic size determines the best level of technology
achieved through diverting resources from current production to research and
development activities. In this sense it is suboptimal for a small country to invest
in too much research and development; the increase in productive efficiency would
apply to too small a base to justify the foregone output. Whatever other factors
cooperate in determining international technological disparities, differences in eco-
[Vol. 45: No. 2
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nomic size are a sufficient explanation. The United States is huge relative to its
neighbors and for that reason, if for no other, dominates them technologically and
attracts their mobile production factors.
Whereas it would be inappropriate for each Latin American country to dupli-
cate U.S. technology through its own research and development activities, it is
presumably possible to transfer readymade U.S. technology to those countries,
thus eliminating the primary cause of migration. Policies 11 through 20 in table 7
incorporate this experiment. They reveal, however, that while the real national
income of each country rises dramatically under technology transfer, labor's real
wage in each country collapses. Nevertheless, experiment G (policy 12) reveals
that all benefits of complete economic integration (as under policy 20) can be
achieved provided only that the accompanying changes can be accommodated. In
this sense, the migration problem can be solved. It is unnecessary for people to
move to another country when their home country has access to the same
technology.
VI
ACCOMMODATION AND COMPENSATION
The immigration problem boils down to the accommodation of a large work
force presently without access to adequate technology. Whether people move or
technology is transferred, much more foreign labor than land and capital will be
brought under the aegis of American production functions. This can only increase
the relative scarcity of capital, and especially of land, and will ultimately render
labor a free good everywhere.
Theoretically, of course, the increase in total worldwide output means that
everyone could be better off even though unskilled labor would be a free good.
Economists have long been aware of the so-called compensation principle,
whereby a change is deemed desirable if the gainers compensate the losers until no
one prefers the former (but some or all prefer the new) situation. 5 This classic and
straightforward principle has never been openly applied in the United States. Per-
haps this is because economic policies are forged by political coalitions which feel
no compunction to share their gains with losers and because gainers manage to
conceal their identity and how they reap their gains.
General equilibrium models of the type used here directly reveal the gainers
and losers via the utility measure u, therefore enabling the implementation of the
compensation principle. The simplest way to do this is first to obtain a consensus
agreement on the factoral distribution of income in the society-the percentages of
total money income that go to interest income, rental income, unskilled worker
compensation, skilled worker compensation, and so forth. With these factoral
shares guaranteed, the next task is simply to operate a self-financing system of
taxes and subsidies to maintain the stated shares in the face of any alteration in the
underlying factor prices. Alterations could result, for instance, from a transfer of
15. See P. Samuelson, The Evaluation ofReal Income, 2 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (n.s.) 1-29 (1950); Social
Indifference Curves, 70 Q. J. ECON. 1-22 (1956).
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technology, a change in tariffs, or a new immigration policy. Any such policy
which increases real national income should obtain unanimous political support
once factor income shares are guaranteed. Political conflicts then would center
only around setting those shares-a completely separate matter from that of
raising aggregate income via policies affecting technology, trade, and migration.
The accommodation of either immigration or technology transfer to render
immigration unnecessary clearly requires a compensatory subsidy of the unskilled
wage rate in the United States, a subsidy that would be paid out of the increased
earnings of capital and land. In some cases capital may also require compensa-
tion. Such subsidies should be paid only to U.S. citizens and could easily be based
on W-2 form earnings.
A wage subsidy is long overdue in any event. It is becoming obvious that the
minimum legal wage rate of about $3.00 per hour is already too high to clear the
labor market. Yet, even if one earns that rate for fifty 40-hour weeks per year
(which would be quite difficult), his or her income is only $6000 per year-not half
the average per capita income of the country. If that income is shared with a
single dependent, the family is well below the poverty level. Yet this rate draws in
millions of migrants from countries where the wages are still only a small fraction
of U.S. wages.
The present de facto policy of retiring the least skilled workers by placing them
on welfare as the only means of alleviating their poverty is clearly doomed to
failure. It costs much more to pay a family $12,000 a year not to work than to pay
a wage subsidy of, say, $3.00 per hour for work the family members can find. A
policy of retiring U.S. families to welfare while still accepting at least half a million
illegal immigrants per year is even clearer madness. A generalized wage subsidy
paid to American workers that can be varied as needed in order to accommodate
industrialization in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World is the best
response to the economic pressures causing migration.
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